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The Nation of Islam (NOI), a Black nationalist organization espousing a heterodox 
Islamic doctrine, has intrigued the American public since its founding in 1930. Producing 
notable adherents such as Malcolm X, Muhammad Ali, Louis Farrakhan, Khalid Abdul 
Muhammad, and Imam Warith Deen Mohammed, the NOI has often been heralded 
for its recruitment and subsequent moral, physical, and spiritual transformation 
of “the rejected and despised”; the pimps, prostitutes, criminals, drug addicts, and 
other downtrodden Blacks. Were it just this record of uplift and transformation, the 
NOI may be viewed favorably in the eyes of mainstream society. In most circles, 
however, the NOI has been relegated to the margins of serious consideration.  
 At the heart of this condemnation and dismissal is the contentious and controversial 
nature of the NOI’s religious and social doctrine. Much of the religiously stylized doctrine, 
referred to as “The Teachings,” is viewed as ahistorical narratives and seemingly far-
fetched, racially antagonistic myths. Three of the more publicly known and controversial 
aspects of its doctrine are the depictions of whites as “devils” (Muhammad 1965, 100), 
Blacks as “God” (NOI 1995, 10), and the organization’s endorsement of the geographical 
separation of Blacks and whites (Muhammad 1965, 226). These assertions, along with 
the NOI’s story of Yacub (the progenitor of the white race), clashes between the NOI 
and police, the organization’s militant and quasi-military posture, and other aspects have 
resulted in the NOI being cast as a potentially violent organization with a penchant for 
anti-white hatred and anti-Semitism (Anti-Defamation League).
But are myths and an allegedly hate-filled doctrine truly all there is to the NOI? In the 
words that follow, I offer an analysis of the NOI that counters the traditional indictments 
referenced above. In doing so, I argue that the polarizing pronouncements and positions of 
the NOI are more than just the nonsensical rantings of a hate group. Rather, the seemingly 
divisive theological and separatist rhetoric of the NOI expresses a liberatory doctrine that 
interprets, in religious terms, the lived experiences of Black people as they navigate an 
all-encompassing world of white supremacy. Thus, I argue, the pronouncements of  the 
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NOI work to reclaim and restructure an existence and identity that has historically been 
negated for Black people. To support my claim, in the second section of this article, I 
suggest that the NOI’s doctrine should be included within the traditions known as Black 
existential philosophy and Africana phenomenology. I further argue that the NOI uses the 
phenomenological framework of embodiment to traverse these two traditions. 
In the final section of this article, I analyze the purpose and function of three declarations 
found in the NOI’s doctrine: the claims that the white man is the “devil” and the Black man is 
“God,” and that the NOI’s goal is establishing a separate, autonomous territory for Blacks.1 
By destabilizing racially dehumanizing metanarratives and reconstructing the agency of 
Black existence (mental, physical, and spiritual), it is my argument that the doctrine and 
practices of the NOI can best be characterized as a restorative and recuperative display of 
a critical hermeneutic phenomenology, or what I consider a phenomenology of Blackness.
I should, however, be clear that this effort should in no way be viewed as an attempt 
at validation. My aim is not to “legitimize” The Teachings of the NOI by invoking 
mainstream philosophies, theories, and scholars. The organization’s ninety-year record of 
the mental, physical, and spiritual transformation of its members and their communities 
has already conferred legitimacy on the organization in the eyes of many. Rather, I have 
three goals for this paper. Generally speaking, a major goal is to contribute to the increasing 
body of scholarly literature that engages in the academic analysis of the NOI.2 Scholars in 
the burgeoning field of Elijah Muhammad Studies attempt to highlight the multifaceted, 
interdisciplinary nature of the Teachings of the Nation of Islam (Pitre 2010). This analysis 
is just such an endeavor. As a phenomenologist, another prominent goal of this paper 
is to provoke in the reader a phenomenological reduction. By moving the reader away 
from the natural attitude (the every day, “taken for granted” view of the NOI as a violent 
hate group) to the phenomenological attitude (a suspension of our taken for granted view 
and an openness to a deeper understanding of the NOI), this paper can hopefully bracket 
preexisting assumptions about the NOI and offer an altogether different understanding 
of the organization, its doctrine, and its motives. Building on the previous two goals, the 
primary goal of this analysis is to retrieve the doctrine of  the NOI, commonly referred to 
as The Teachings, from the dustbin of absurdities to which they have for some time been 
relegated. This will be done by showing the congruence of the NOI’s philosophy with 
many foundational and widely accepted theorists and philosophies, many of which the 
NOI predates. I will also show that the NOI’s doctrine can also be understood as a creative 
and potent contribution to a longstanding Black philosophical tradition. By linking the 
Teachings, philosophy, and phenomenology, my analysis will make clear that, rejecting 
the NOI’s philosophy means simultaneously rejecting many mainstream, highly coveted 
philosophical traditions. In other words, the aim of this work is vindication, not validation.
1 Here “Black man” is used in the general sense, encompassing both Black men and women.
2 See Acevedo, Ordner, and Thomspon (2010); Akom (2003); Berg (2005); Curtis IV (2002, 2005); Finley 
(2017); Gibson and Berg (2017).
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NATION OF ISLAM
 
Founded on July 4, 1930 by an enigmatic figure named W. D. Fard, the NOI preaches 
a doctrine of moral uprightness, religious devotion, economic independence, self-
determination, and a racialized, esoteric version of Islam that was seen as a drastic departure 
from Islam as preached and practiced throughout the orthodox Muslim world. Erdmann 
Beynon, in what is likely the earliest scholarly investigation of the organization, noted that 
the NOI arose “out of the growing disillusionment and race consciousness of recent Negro 
migrants to northern industrial cities” (1938, 894). Fard was said to have come to America 
from “the Holy city Mecca, Arabia.” Upon arrival, he initially went door to door in the 
poor Black neighborhoods of Detroit, Michigan in an effort to teach the residents “the 
knowledge of ourselves, of God and the devil” (Muhammad 1965, 16). We are told that Fard 
. . . rapidly gained followers and he continued to teach them about 
the deceptive character and temporary domination of “blue-eyed-
devils” or white man, the glorious history and significance of the 
“Black Nation,” the Caucasian race, the religions of Islam and 
Christianity and, as well, the “truth” about the beginning of creation. 
(Tinaz 2001, 15)
From its inception, the doctrine of the NOI has been controversial, polarizing, and racialized. 
As Beynon documented in 1938, Fard himself authored ritualized texts that taught that 
 
. . . [t]he Black men in North America are not Negroes, but members 
of the lost tribe of Shebazz, stolen by traders from the Holy City of 
Mecca 379 years ago. The prophet came to America to find and to 
bring back to life his long lost brethren, from whom the Caucasians 
had taken away their language, their nation and their religion. Here 
in America they were living other than themselves. They must learn 
that they are the original people, noblest of the nations of the earth. 
The Caucasians are the colored people, since they have lost their 
original color. The original people must regain their religion, which 
is Islam, their language, which is Arabic, and their culture, which 
is astronomy and higher mathematics, especially calculus. (900-01)
After three and a half years of proselytizing and amassing a following of five thousand 
to eight thousand Black adherents in Detroit, Fard vanished in 1934 as abruptly and as 
mysteriously as he appeared (896-97). Before Fard’s departure, he bequeathed leadership 
of the NOI to Elijah Muhammad, one of his most ardent followers. After assuming 
leadership of the NOI, Elijah Muhammad began professing that Fard (now referred to as 
Master Fard Muhammad) was in reality Allah/God in physical form (Gardell 1996, 58). 
This controversial, anthropomorphic doctrine continues to be the bedrock of the NOI’s 
teaching. 
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From the 1930’s through the mid-1950’s the NOI witnessed moderate growth as Elijah 
Muhammad spearheaded the founding of  temples in various cities including Chicago, 
Illinois; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Washington, DC; and Cincinnati, Ohio (Gardell 1996, 
65). After experiencing internal strife and waning membership due to Elijah Muhammad’s 
incarceration for violation of the Selective Service Act of 1940, the NOI garnered an 
explosion in nationwide visibility throughout the 1960’s due to the popularity of two of its 
most captivating and charismatic members, Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali (70-71).
Up through the mid-1970’s the NOI witnessed substantial popularity and growth within 
Black communities nationwide. This growth culminated in the establishment of their own 
bank, supermarkets, import business, restaurants, bakeries, trucking fleet, printing press, 
office buildings, slaughterhouses, and other acquisitions that enabled self-sufficiency and 
independence within the Black community (Muhammad’s Temple No. 2 1975). In 1975, 
however, the NOI would suffer a debilitating loss due to the passing of Elijah Muhammad. 
Upon his passing, Muhammad’s son Wallace assumed leadership of the organization. After 
assuming leadership, Wallace sold off the assets, properties, and holdings of the organization, 
changed the name from the NOI to the American Bilallian Community, changed the 
doctrine to conform with the Islam of the orthodox Muslim world, and renounced all of 
the racialized, separatist teachings of the NOI (Lincoln 1994, 264-65). This drastic change 
of course caused several defections from the organization in the months that followed. The 
most consequential was Minister Louis Farrakhan who, breaking with Wallace’s (who had 
changed his name to Imam Warith Deen Mohammed) new direction in 1977, reconstituted 
Elijah Muhammad’s version of the organization complete with a reinstatement of the name 
Nation of Islam, the strict codes of behavior, the deification of Master Fard Muhammad, 
and the original racialized, separatist doctrine (Gardell 1996, 122-35). 
The common thread throughout all of  the NOI’s history, however, has been the 
considerable condemnation and ire that its teachings have garnered. The Southern Poverty 
Law Center, an organization itself  plagued by charges of  systemic racism and sexism, has 
dismissed the NOI as a “hate group” that espouses a blatantly racist and bigoted doctrine 
against whites in general and Jews specifically (Valencia 2019; Southern Poverty Law 
Center). One such example is the charge of  anti-Semitism which, to some, is viewed as 
a normative aspect of  the NOI’s discourse, doctrine, and practice. But this claim begs 
the question: normative to whom? Anti-Semitism was certainly not viewed as a defining 
normative aspect of  the NOI by the multitude of  black men who attended the Million Man 
March in 1995. In any case, the charges of  anti-Semitism are relatively new (they date to 
the 1980s) and the focus of  the accusations are comments made by the organization’s leader 
(Minister Louis Farrakhan) and not the organization’s doctrine itself. It is the organization’s 
doctrine that is the focus of  this article. 
Although this article does not focus on the claim of  anti-Semitism as a normative 
context in which to view the NOI, this in no way precludes the possibility of  discussing 
other doctrinal aspects that are widely accepted as being normative to the organization. 
For example, the NOI doctrine on UFOs, the organization’s dietary habits (particularly the 
abstention from eating pork and the group’s traditional bean pie dessert), the NOI’s visual 
presentation and aesthetic (the flowing gowns of  female members and the signature suit 
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and bow tie “uniform” worn by male members), and the group’s embrace of  patriarchy 
are all significant and commonly acknowledged normative contexts in which to discuss the 
NOI. Relatedly, the three controversial tenets of  the NOI’s doctrine under investigation 
in this analysis were selected not just for their polarizing nature, but also because of  their 
normativity with respect to the organization’s discourse. The three doctrinal aspects under 
investigation are the pronouncements that the white man is “The Devil” (Muhammad 
1965, 100) and the Black man is “God” (NOI 1995, 10), and the NOI’s official endorsement 
of  the geographical separation of  Blacks and Whites (Muhammad 1965, 226-32). Before 
dealing at length with these assertions, however, a philosophical grounding must be laid in 
order to properly contextualize these unsettling claims.
 
II. CONTEXTUALIZING THE NOI:  
PHILOSOPHY, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND EMBODIMENT
My intent in this section is to view the NOI’s doctrine through the lens of two rich 
traditions, Black existential philosophy and Africana phenomenology. I further argue that 
it is the NOI’s use of the equivalent of the phenomenological concept of embodiment that 
nestles the group comfortably within the fertile soil of these two philosophical traditions. 
By viewing the NOI’s doctrine through a phenomenological lens, I will be countering the 
prevailing depictions of the organization. These widely accepted depictions have consistently 
characterized the NOI’s doctrine as “confused and inconsistent” (Lincoln 1994, 79) or 
as “absurdity” (Clegg 1997, 41). Traditional depictions of the NOI have also framed its 
members as “ignorant Southern-type Negroes who don’t know any better” (Lincoln 1994, 
79), have described its patriarch, Elijah Muhammad, as “an illiterate crackpot” (79), and 
have generally discarded the NOI’s entire body of discourse as “fantastic and unbelievable” 
(xi). Locating the teachings of the NOI within Black existential philosophy and Africana 
phenomenology neutralizes these superficial, pejorative, and dismissive critiques and at the 
same time rightly situates the NOI’s doctrine within the long-standing tradition of Black 
philosophical critique. In explicating the deeper philosophical implications of the NOI’s 
doctrine, I will also be confirming Lincoln’s assertion that “[a]n ideology, though weird, 
often means more than it says” (xi). 
BLACK EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY
 
Black existential philosophy is a philosophy of existence that concerns itself with the “freedom, 
anguish, responsibility, embodied agency, sociality, and liberation” of Black people (Gordon 
1997, 3). Undergirding much of Black existential philosophy is the rejection of normative 
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philosophical assertions grounded in western, Eurocentric premises.3 A more relevant and 
localized conception of the world is put forth that “situates philosophical reflective thought 
within the concrete muck and mire of raced embodied existence” (Yancy 2011, 552). Thus, 
there is a rejection and a reflection inherent in Black existential philosophy that asks and 
answers the question, “[w]hat is to be understood by Black suffering?” (Gordon 1997, 1). 
Viewed from this vantage point, contributions to Black existential thought span centuries 
and have been offered by a multitude of writers and theorists such as Frederick Douglas, 
David Walker, Marcus Garvey, Ida B. Wells, Richard Wright, Alain Locke, Aimé Césaire, 
bell hooks, and James Baldwin, among countless others. Similarly, the philosophical 
foundation of the NOI’s doctrine is one “born of struggle” (Harris 1983, ix). Framed in 
this way, the NOI’s exegesis fits squarely within the enduring tradition of Black existential 
thought that seeks the freedom of Black agency through liberation from an anguished Black 
existence in anti-Black social spaces. This is discussed in more detail in the sections ahead.
On Black suffering, Charles Mills writes that a racialized, embodied existence has 
the effect of fashioning Black bodies into a racial subperson, meaning “an entity which, 
because of phenotype, seems … human in some respects but not in others” (1998, 6). 
Alternatively, Thomas F. Slaughter’s articulation refers to racialized embodied existence 
as “physiognomic degradation” (1983, 284) For Slaughter, degradation based on Black 
skin first asserts that “Blackness embodies the ostracized” (284). Then, the duress that 
naturally accompanies the degradation of ostracization produces a “two-pronged process 
of externally imposed inferiorization and subsequent internalization of that inferiority” 
(284). Regarding the interrelation between Black existential philosophy and Africana 
phenomenology, Slaughter’s articulation of the epidermalized existence of Black bodies 
and his conception of  the dual inferiorization/internalization process builds upon the ideas 
of W.E.B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, two prominent contributors to Black existential 




Paget Henry defined Africana phenomenology as “the self-reflective descriptions of the 
constituting activities of the consciousness of Africana peoples, after the natural attitudes of 
Africana egos have been displaced by de-centering techniques practiced in these cultures” 
(2005, 79). In discussing Africana phenomenology, Henry ascribed its motives as being 
similar to the rejection and reflection inherent in Black existential philosophy (of which 
Africana phenomenology is a subfield). Highlighting exemplars of Africana phenomenology, 
Henry identified Du Bois’s phenomenological project and featured it prominently in his 
discussion. It was in Du Bois’s phenomenological description of being a Black man in the 
3 Similar if not interchangeable designations are African-American philosophy, Afro-American 
philosophy, and Africana philosophy.
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U.S. at the turn of the past century that we find one of the most fruitful instantiations of 
Africana thought.  
In Du Bois’s phenomenology, for example, we find one of the earliest attempts to carve 
out a Black consciousness separate and distinct from the universalizations of traditional 
western philosophy. Specifically, Du Bois’s rejection and reconceptualization of Hegel’s 
philosophy gave way to the Du Boisian notions of first site and second site, otherwise known 
as double consciousness. First site refers to the affirming tendency of a Black person to see 
one’s authentic Black self through one’s own eyes, while second site indexes the degrading 
and debilitating tendency of a Black person “to see him/herself as a ‘negro,’ that is, through 
the eyes of the white other” (Henry 2005, 89). For Du Bois, this represented an existential 
dilemma for Black people that was much different from the one proposed by Hegel. Citing 
an imperfect fit between the tenets of traditional western philosophy and the Black lived 
experience, Du Bois’s phenomenology establishes “a culturally distinct, and hence non-
European, site of original meanings, discourses and experiences” (2005, 85). Emanating 
from this Black, culturally distinct foundation, the goal of Du Bois’s phenomenological 
project was to enable Africana self-consciousness “to see through the darkness of second 
sight” (90). In many ways, Du Bois’s attempt to rectify Black suffering through reclaiming a 
proper vision of self was identical to the NOI’s goal of counteracting the severe deficiency 
in Black people’s “knowledge of self” (Muhammad 1965, 51) that had been brought on by 
centuries of degradation at the hands of white society. This was summed up by the NOI in 
its clarion call, “BLACKMAN, ACCEPT YOUR OWN” (50). 
In Fanon’s phenomenology, we encounter Black suffering as a result of the penetrating 
and all-pervasive white gaze. Fanon critiqued Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (and western 
philosophy’s) universalized body schema by fracturing it into thirds. First, a de-centering 
of Merleau-Ponty’s universalized body points out that “the man of color encounters 
difficulties in elaborating his body schema” because, rather than the certainty of white, 
habitual actions, what reigns around the Black body is “an atmosphere of certain 
uncertainty” (Fanon 2008, 90). In this critique of a universal, autonomous body schema, 
Fanon lays bare the fundamental oversight inherent in Merleau-Ponty, the reality that 
the Black body inhabiting white spaces has no genuine presence in the white world. The 
fracturing continues when Fanon invokes the historical-racial schema. The white gaze’s 
stultifying effect on the Black body informs the historical-racial schema by replacing the 
Black body schema with a caricature of a person that the white psyche has woven “out 
of a thousand details, anecdotes, and stories” from a contrived Black past (91). The third 
fracture Fanon introduces is the epidermal-racial schema that synonymizes Blackness with 
all of the “cannibalism, backwardness, fetishism, racial stigmas” and “slave traders” the 
white psyche has historically attached to the Black body (92). Ultimately, Fanon’s tripartite 
phenomenology speaks to the negating of the ontological reality of Black bodies. As a result 
of this negation, a Black ontology “is made impossible in a colonized and acculturated 
society” (89). Fanon, in his rejection of the white gaze, ultimately arrives at a remedy for 
this negation, a remedy not unlike what permeates the NOI’s pro-Black discourse. That 
remedy was Fanon’s decision “to assert myself as a BLACK MAN” (95).
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Both the broad expanse of Black existential philosophy and its subgenre, Africana 
phenomenology, are the logical ground in which to frame the NOI’s doctrine. Black 
existential philosophy and Africana phenomenology are rooted in rejection, reflection, and 
re-articulation. So too is the NOI’s philosophy. In the NOI we see a stern rejection, a 
rebuke even, of traditional, white narratives and depictions of Black bodies. The NOI’s 
hermeneutic reflections on the Black lived experience indict the white psyche and its white 
supremacist manifestations. In the upcoming discussion, I argue that the NOI’s prescriptive 
measures seek to rehabilitate Black bodies through an emphatic embrace and a bold 
rearticulation of Blackness. On these grounds, I make the case that the NOI’s doctrine is 
yet another articulation of Black existential philosophy. Instrumental in this articulation is 
the use of embodiment as the source and the site of their discursive project.
 
EMBODIMENT 
An integral aspect of philosophical and phenomenological thinking is a concern with the 
physical body. Our bodies are that which mediate our interaction with and experience 
of the world. Traditionally, discussions of body have been guided by the Cartesian 
split that separates mind and body. From this duality, the body is conceptualized 
as being governed solely by either the physical laws germane to all living organisms 
(physiological), or a self-constructed, psychological consciousness. In offering a 
reevaluation of this dualism in phenomenological terms, Merleau-Ponty argued instead 
for an understanding of the body as that which is produced when the physiological 
and the psychological “gear into each other” (2012, 79). Describing the intertwined, 
synergistic nature of the body and the world, Merleau-Ponty metaphorically envisioned 
“[o]ne’s own body in the world just as the heart is in the organism: it continuously 
breathes life into the visible spectacle, animates it and nourishes it from within, and forms 
a system with it” (209). Further elucidating his “body schema,” Merleau-Ponty notes: 
Bodily existence, which streams forth through me without my 
complicity, is but the sketch of a genuine presence in the world. But 
it, at the very least, grounds the possibility of such a presence and 
establishes our primary pact with the world. (168)
Here we see the vital importance of embodiment for Merleau-Ponty. The phrasing “without 
complicity” speaks to the effortless nature of bodily existence and his mention of “genuine 
presence” and “primary pact” reflect the preeminence of the body as we experience the 
world. Understood in this way, embodiment is the very vehicle through which Erlebnis, or 
our lived experience, is achieved and, according to Merleau-Ponty, universally experienced. 
However, Merleau-Ponty’s universal body schema was rearticulated by Fanon in light of 
the “disorientation” experienced by Black bodies. 
 
 
                                                               Countering the “Phenomenology of Whiteness”  • 27E. Anthony Muhammad
Puncta    Vol. 4.1    2021
III. THE DISORIENTED BLACK BODY 
In describing his experience of disorientation, Fanon shares with us that, 
Disoriented, incapable of confronting the Other, the white man, 
who had no scruples about imprisoning me, I transported myself...
far, very far from my self, and gave myself up as an object…Yet 
this reconsideration of myself, this thematization, was not my idea. 
(2008, 92) 
Further elaborating on the stifling and negating nature of the Black experience under the 
white gaze, Sarah Ahmed extends Fanon’s discussion of disorientation. The crux of Ahmed’s 
argument is that, far from a neutral world of existence that all embodied souls inhabit 
and experience with equal agency, the world is in fact a racialized one. This racialized 
world has been constructed so that white bodies experience the world as a “body-at-home” 
and Black bodies are “stopped” from naturally and effortlessly inhabiting the same world 
(Ahmed 2006, 111, 110). Regarding this “stopping,” Ahmed notes that, 
 
For bodies that are not extended by the skin of the social, bodily 
movement is not so easy. Such bodies are stopped, where the stopping 
is an action that creates its own impressions. Who are you? Why are 
you here? What are you doing? Each question, when asked, is a kind 
of stopping device: you are stopped by being asked the question, just as 
asking the question requires you to be stopped. A phenomenology 
of “being stopped” might take us in a different direction than one 
that begins with motility, with a body that “can do” by flowing into 
space. (139)
For Ahmed, the affirming orientation of the world “around” white bodies is in stark contrast 
to the negating and stultifying orientation of the world “toward” Black bodies (115). This 
racialized lived experience manifests as a “phenomenology of whiteness” (138) that invites 
white bodies into a world of “I can” and excludes Black bodies in a disorienting world 
of “I cannot” (139). To summarize, Ahmed described this racialized phenomenology of 
whiteness as
 
. . . the ease with which the white body extends itself in the world through how it is 
orientated toward objects and others. To make this point simply: whiteness 
becomes a social and bodily orientation given that some bodies will 
be more at home in a world that is oriented around whiteness. If we 
began instead with disorientation … then the descriptions we offer 
will be quite different. (138)  
It is my contention that, in the doctrines of the NOI, we encounter a philosophy that 
does indeed “begin with disorientation.” By anchoring their doctrine in the disorienting 
experiences of Black bodies in white spaces, the NOI has in fact crafted a phenomenology 
that has proved to be “quite different.” The following discussion of three aspects of the 
                                                               Countering the “Phenomenology of Whiteness”  • 28E. Anthony Muhammad
Puncta    Vol. 4.1    2021
organization’s doctrine introduces what I term the NOI’s phenomenology of Blackness. 
Their phenomenology of Blackness, contrary to the “phenomenology of whiteness” 
described by Ahmed, is grounded in and privileges the embodied experiences of Blacks. 
Aspects of the doctrine under analysis in this article are, 1) the assertion that the white man 
is the “devil,” 2) the assertion that the Black man is “God,” and 3) the NOI’s endorsement 
of the geographical separation of Blacks and whites. By analyzing each of these assertions 
in detail, I further argue that the NOI’s discursive project, in total, is actually a critical 
hermeneutic phenomenology presented through the lens and language of religion.
 
IV. THE NATION OF ISLAM’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF BLACKNESS 
 
 THE WHITE MAN IS THE DEVIL 
Throughout the NOI’s discourse and doctrine, whites are frequently referred to as devils. 
For example, in Message to the Blackman, one of the organization’s foundational texts, a 
chapter entitled “The Devil” offers the official NOI history of and position on the devil. 
In it, Elijah Muhammad tells us that whites are “a race whom Allah has made manifest 
to you and me as being real devils” (1965, 100). In The Supreme Wisdom, a collection of 
catechisms, mathematical word problems, and narratives given to Elijah Muhammad by 
Master Fard Muhammad, we read another descriptive analysis identifying whites as devils. 
In the “Student Enrollment” the question is asked, “Who is the Colored man?” (NOI 1995, 
9). In response, the answer is given: “The Colored man is the Caucasian (white man). Or, 
Yacub’s grafted Devil—the Skunk of the planet Earth” (NOI 1995, 10). In both of these 
characterizations we find evocative depictions of whites. But what are these assertions if not 
ad hominem, racially antagonistic attacks?
In a groundbreaking analysis of this aspect of NOI doctrine, Stephen C. Finley situated 
these “whites as devils” statements within the historical context from which the NOI 
emerges. He informs us that the notion of the white man being the devil 
 
. . . is only one small aspect of the narrative that attempts to make 
sense of an absurd world: a terrifying world for African Americans, 
in which their bodies were the objects of racial discourses of 
inferiority and inhumanity that justified their imminent expurgation, 
destruction, and mutilation for centuries of American history. (2017, 
154) 
In his analysis, Finley (2017) labels the NOI’s summation that white people are devils as 
“theological phenomenology” and correctly identifies the purpose of this particular claim 
as describing and interpreting, phenomenologically, the racialized, terrorized existence of 
Black bodies under white supremacy (157). What Finley goes on to make abundantly clear 
is that the NOI is first and foremost a religious organization. As such, this realization should 
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come to bear on any interpretation or analysis of the claims made by the group. Given this 
religious core and 
 
[h]aving lived in a world wherein whites would viciously and 
gratuitously participate in violent and degrading acts against Black 
people, Muhammad needed a way to make sense of this terror. That 
is, he needed a theodicy, a way to justify the presence of evil in light of 
the purported goodness and omnipotence of God. (166)
Through Finley’s analysis, one comes to see the summation of whites as devils as a rhetorical 
device that is not only descriptive of the Black lived experience, but acts also as a theodicy 
used to make sense of that experience in the minds of oppressed and subjugated Blacks. 
Viewed in this way, the evocative nature of framing whites as devils sheds light on another 
of its important functions: its illumination of the fundamental, phenomenological essence of 
the Black lived experience. 
In Researching Lived Experience, Van Manen (2016) wrote that essence      
    
may be understood as a linguistic construction, a description of a 
phenomenon. A good description that constitutes the essences of 
something is construed so that the structure of a lived experience is 
revealed to us in such a fashion that we are now able to grasp the 
nature and significance of this experience in a hitherto unseen way. 
When a phenomenologist asks for the essence of a phenomenon—a 
lived experience—then the phenomenological inquiry is not unlike 
an artistic endeavor, a creative attempt to somehow capture a certain 
phenomenon of life in a linguistic description that is both holistic and 
analytical, evocative and precise, unique and universal, powerful 
and sensitive. So an appropriate topic for phenomenological inquiry 
is determined by the questioning of the essential nature of a lived 
experience: a certain way of being in the world. (39) 
Van Manen’s description captures the “essence” of what is at work in the NOI’s “linguistic 
construction” of whites as devils. The construction itself is an attempt to “describe the 
phenomenon” of the Black experience under entrenched and institutionalized white 
supremacy. The racialized language (which matches the violent and viciously racialized 
nature of white supremacy) grabs our attention in such a way that we easily “grasp the 
nature and significance” of what it is like living as a Black body in a viciously racist society. 
By framing Black embodiment in this way, the NOI is giving a “good description” of Black 
lived experiences in a “hitherto unseen way.” By enlisting creatively descriptive religious 
symbolism (framing whites as “devils”), these linguistic framings are “not unlike an artistic 
endeavor.” By likening the day to day experiences of segregation, lynching, rape, murder, 
police brutality, and the deprivation of humanity and justice as the equivalent of “Hell,” 
the NOI’s reference to whites as “devils” identifies them as the authors and overlords of this 
Hellish Black existence just as the devil, in theology, rules as the overlord of Hell. In this 
way, this linguistic framing of Black existence serves as an “attempt to somehow capture 
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a certain phenomenon of life in a linguistic description that is both holistic and analytical, 
evocative and precise, unique and universal, powerful and sensitive” (Van Manen 2016, 39). 
In short, declaring that white people are devils uses religious language to offer a creatively 
descriptive way of tapping into the essence of Black life under white supremacy. By doing 
so, the NOI is offering a disruptive portrayal of “a certain way of being in the world,” that 
is, being Black in a world of white, terroristic spaces. 
 
THE BLACK MAN IS GOD 
While proclaiming that white people are “The Devil” is, as we have seen, both descriptive 
and creatively interpretive, its corollary, the Black man is “God”, serves a different purpose. 
Referring back to the “Student Enrollment” in the NOI’s Supreme Wisdom, we are asked, 
“Who is the Original man?” (NOI 1995, 9). In response we are told, “The Original man 
is the Asiatic black man; the Maker; the Owner; the Cream of the planet Earth—God of 
the Universe” (NOI 1995, 10). By offering these pronouncements on God and the devil, 
the NOI is in fact linguistically disrupting the “normality” of “habitual” (“at home in 
the world”) white existence. By doing so, the NOI displays an understanding of the fact 
that “the Black body has, within the context of its tortuous sojourn through the crucible 
of American and European history, been a site of discursive, symbolic, ontological, and 
existential battle” (Yancy 2017, 106). By deploying a disruptive language that intends to 
boldly re-orient Black embodiment in the world, the NOI becomes a willful and active 
combatant in this “existential battle” by engaging in linguistic resistance. But just as casting 
the white man as “The Devil” is deconstructive in its ability to dismantle the psychological 
pedestal that whites have constructed and perched themselves upon, proclaiming that the 
Black man is “God” is constructive, serving to rebuild an affirming, authentic, and agential 
Black existence that the “phenomenology of whiteness” had destroyed. 
Bolstering this point, Yancy informs us that, “Black resistance, as a mode of decoding, 
is simultaneously a process of recoding Black embodied existence through processes of 
opposition and affirmation.” He further notes that, “the moment of resistance, in other words, 
is the moment of becoming, of being made anew” (2017, 108). Yancy’s idea of “resistance 
as becoming” is the driving force behind the NOI’s statement that the white man is “The 
Devil” and the Black man is “God.” In an effort to repair centuries of mental, physical, 
psychological, and spiritual abuse at the hands of white society, the NOI deploys a religiously-
styled countermeasure that seeks both to stabilize and destabilize, to build and destroy. For 
the NOI, the denouncement of whites as “devils” minimizes those who were once deified 
while the framing of Blacks as “Gods” rehabilitates those who were once dehumanized. 
Commenting on this type of bi-directional, ontological swing, Yancy tells us that 
[T]here is a moment of renarrating the self at the moment of 
resistance, which also involves a disruption of the historical force of 
the white same; for to resist is to re-story one’s identity, even if that 
story is fragmented and replete with tensions. (110)
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But the invocation of “God” status for Blacks intends to do more than just “re-story” the 
identity of disoriented Blacks in theological terms. While the ontological reality of whites 
as “The Devil” serves a phenomenologically de-scriptive purpose, conferring godhood on 
Black bodies is pre-scriptive; it aims to prescribe actions that will ultimately transform the 
disoriented Black body through a ritualized process of molding righteous words, ways, and 
actions. I liken this prescriptive strategy to the idea of mimicry as described by Merleau-
Ponty.
In Phenomenology of Perception (2012), Merleau-Ponty describes the “mimicry” involved 
when he lays down to go to sleep. He notes that, by mimicking the process of sleep (by lying 
in bed on his side, knees drawn up, breathing slowed and eyes closed), sleep eventually takes 
over him. Speaking on the process of mimicking sleep in order to induce sleep, Merleau-
Ponty says: 
 
The role of the body is to ensure this metamorphosis. It transforms 
ideas into things and my mimicry of sleep into actual sleep. If the 
body can symbolize existence, this is because it actualizes it and 
because it is its actuality. (167)
The transformation from Blacks as disoriented to Blacks as Gods is where Merleau-Ponty’s 
words coincide with the NOI’s doctrine and practice. Within the NOI there exists a strict 
code of behavior and an expectation of moral thinking, speaking, and living. This has 
been codified into what is called The Restrictive Law of Islam (Farrakhan 2012, 35). All of the 
mental, physical, and linguistic activities that one engages in are expected to be carried 
out in a righteous and morally upstanding manner. This regimented righteousness is akin 
to Merleau-Ponty’s mimicry of sleep. In seeking to transform from a waking state to a 
sleeping state, Merleau-Ponty adopted the posture, positions, and activities of a sleeping 
person. Eventually, “[s]leep ‘arrives’ at a particular moment, it settles upon this imitation 
of itself that I offered it, and I succeed in becoming what I pretended to be” (2012, 166). 
In this same way, the regimented actions, thoughts, and behaviors of NOI adherents 
are enacted in their daily lives in order to mimic righteous, godly behavior. By thinking, 
believing, and acting as though one is God-like, it is presumed that, like Merleau-Ponty’s 
mimicking of sleep, a “metamorphosis” of the Black mind and body will also “arrive,” at 
which time the NOI adherent has succeeded “in becoming what they pretended to be.” 
Thus, understanding the NOI’s claim that the Black man is “God” in the context of the 
mimicry of sleep allows us to rework Merleau-Ponty’s quote to state that: The Black man is 
God. The role of the body is to ensure this metamorphosis. It transforms the NOI’s idea that the Black man 
is God into things and my mimicry of God into actual godhood. If the body can symbolize my existence as 
God, this is because it actualizes it and because it is its actuality.
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SEPARATION 
The third doctrine under analysis in this article is the promotion of separation as an 
objective of the NOI. In keeping with its religious tenor, the NOI’s call for separation is 
also grounded in a theological context. According to Elijah Muhammad, 
 
This is the great Day of Separation. We heard of this kind of time 
coming ever since we were born. Right? Time! What Time? Time 
for the Great Separation of Black and white. The Bible teaches you 
that there will come a Great Separation…This is what the Bible 
means when it says, ‘He will separate the goats from the sheep.’… 
They are talking about the Black Man and the white man. The white 
man is the goat and you and I are the sheep. (Muhammad quoted in 
Rassoull 1992, 492) 
The call for separation was also publicized in more secular terms. In a section of Elijah 
Muhammad’s Message to the Blackman entitled “What Do The Muslims Want?”, the call for 
separation is again made in unequivocal language (1965, 161). In point number four we 
are told that,
 
We want our people in America whose parents or grandparents 
were descendants from slaves to be allowed, to establish a separate 
state or territory of their own—either on this continent or elsewhere. 
We believe that our former slave-masters are obligated to provide 
such land and that the area must be fertile and minerally rich. We 
believe that our former slave-masters are obligated to maintain and 
supply our needs in this separate territory for the next 20 or 25 years 
until we are able to produce and supply our own needs. Since we 
cannot get along with them in peace and equality after giving them 
400 years of our sweat and blood and receiving in return some of the 
worst treatment human beings have ever experienced, we believe 
our contributions to this land and the suffering forced upon us by 
white America justifies our demand for complete separation in a 
state or territory of our own. (161)
Here Muhammad establishes both a religious and a socio-historical foundation for his call 
for the establishment of an orienting, habitual, affirming, Black space, separate and distinct 
from the disorienting, non-habitual, and dehumanizing existence of Black bodies within 
the white world. The NOI’s call for separation is also geo-political in that it is reminiscent 
of the separation that led to the founding of the nation of Israel in 1948 as well as to the 
colonial separation from England that led to the establishment of the United States. The 
religious nature of the call for separation mirrors the Biblical accounts of Moses’ separation 
from Pharaoh, Lot’s separation from Sodom and Gomorrah, and the Islamic separation 
of prophet Muhammad from Mecca resulting in his hegira to Medina. But even though 
the NOI’s call for physical separation is fueled by the daily atrocities experienced under 
the “phenomenology of whiteness,” its specific goal is the ultimate attainment of a Black 
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“corporeal schema” (Ahmed 2006, 110).
Ahmed, using Fanon’s critique of Merleau-Ponty as a point of departure, observes 
that the universal and undifferentiated “corporeal schema” that western phenomenology 
promoted is not the most basic experience.4 Below this “tactile” and “vestibular” experience 
of the world is a historical-racial schema that supersedes it. This was masterfully exemplified 
through the notion of an “active body” (the white body) as opposed to the Black body that 
has historically been “negated or ‘stopped’ in its tracks” (2006, 110). Simple tasks (such 
as Fanon’s grasping of  a cigarette across a table for example) are implicit to us because 
our bodies are oriented in a space and we know that after initiating a few deliberate steps 
we will achieve a simple task. This orientation and intentionality toward an object or task 
represents one of the stalwart philosophical foundations of phenomenology, the notion 
of “habitual” functioning (130). Drawing from Fanon, Ahmed however informs us that 
deliberateness is not a given when one inhabits a Black body. White society “stops” Black 
bodies from gaining such a deliberateness and a familiarity with the world through racism, 
slavery, Jim Crow, stop and frisk, voter id laws, and other discriminatory realities. This 
stifling of the most basic elements of consciousness and intentionality “interrupts” the way 
of being in the world for Black bodies; “the disorientation affected by racism diminishes capacities for 
action” (Ahmed 2006, 111, emphasis added). It is this disorientation that the NOI confronts 
and seeks to emancipate Black bodies from through its doctrine of separation. 
Ahmed goes on to say that, “[i]f to be human is to be white, then to be not white 
is to inhabit the negative: it is to be ‘not’. The pressure of this ‘not’ is another way of 
describing the social and existential realities of racism” (2006, 139). The NOI’s approach 
to establishing its own “corporeal schema” is to dis-“inhabit the negative,” to depart from 
this negating existence in white society through physical separation. In their view, given the 
four hundred-year history of being “not” and the centuries of “historic-racial” “stopping” 
of Black existence, the only meaningful solution is separation by which Blacks can then 
be reconstituted in a space of their own and where the Black body can “extend itself…in 
order to act on and in the world” (139, emphasis added). Said differently, the NOI’s doctrine of  
physical, geographical separation is an attempt to return the Black body to phenomenology’s 
corporeal schema, that of  a habitual and delberate existence of  a “body at home” and a “Being 
in place” (111). For the NOI, this can only be accomplished through the establishment of  a 
separate and distinct Black space (territory) removed from the tyranny of  white supremacy. 
The freedom to act on and act in a world of their own through establishing a separate, 
physical territory is the manifest expression of the NOI’s phenomenology of Blackness.
 
4 Ahmed is referencing Fanon (2008, 91). 
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V. THE NOI’S CRITICAL HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISCOURSE: 
 AN APOLOGIA 
In this article I’ve offered a picture of the NOI that departs from the traditionally dismissive 
posture taken toward the organization. Looking past initially polarizing aspects and 
surface assumptions about its doctrine, I’ve made the case for the congruence of the NOI’s 
doctrine with longstanding Black and White philosophical traditions. I’ve further argued 
for a depiction of the NOI, its doctrine, and its practices as strategic displays of a critical 
hermeneutic phenomenology. The NOI’s doctrine is critical because of its emancipatory 
and transformative aims. The NOI’s doctrine is hermeneutic due to its creative use of 
religious motifs as interpretive agents of the world around them. And the NOI’s doctrine is 
phenomenological due to its descriptive and interpretive manner of ascribing meaning to 
the lifeworld of disoriented Blacks. Additionally, utilizing three examples, I have suggested 
an understanding of the NOI’s creed that offers a deeper, richer explanation of the NOI’s 
complex interplay of linguistics, religion, philosophy, and phenomenology that are tied 
together through the framework of embodiment. 
 Despite all that I’ve presented, there may still be lingering questions about the 
historicity, rationality, and harshness of the NOI’s discourse. As for the historicity of 
the doctrine, some scholarship, particularly the work of religious scholar Dr. Wesley 
Muhammad, has indeed defended the veracity of the NOI’s claims epistemologically by 
investigating the evidence for the organization’s doctrine and the factual nature of its claims 
(Muhammad 2007; 2009; 2012; 2013). The current study, however, is ontological and, as 
such, a more pertinent question should focus on the “workable” and “unworkable” nature 
of the NOI’s doctrine (Yancy 2017, 112). In other words, does the NOI’s doctrine work? 
Does it adequately orient disoriented Black bodies and create a reality of “I can” for Black 
bodies seeking to escape the “I cannot” of white spaces (Ahmed 2006 139)? Regarding the 
rationality of the NOI’s pronouncements, I offer the words of the hermeneutic philosopher 
Wilhelm Dilthey who proclaimed that, “all understanding contains something irrational 
because life is irrational” (2006, 162). Given the irrationality of institutionalized, state 
sanctioned torture, lynching, discrimination, dehumanization, slavery, and other atrocities 
of the Black experience under white supremacy, one could argue that the presumed 
irrationality of the NOI doctrine merely reflects the irrationality of the Black lived experience 
in white spaces. And finally, on the unapologetic boldness of the NOI’s language and the 
brazen, harsh tone that is often taken, I am reminded of the words of Frantz Fanon when 
he said,
 
I want my voice to be harsh, I don’t want it to be beautiful, I don’t 
want it to be pure, I don’t want it to have all dimensions. I want it to 
be torn through and through, I don’t want it to be enticing, for I am 
speaking of man and his refusal, of the day-to-day rottenness of man, 
of his dreadful failure. (1967, 49)
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The critical hermeneutic phenomenology of the NOI, what I label its phenomenology of 
Blackness, is harsh because the lifeworld of Black embodiment in white spaces has been and 
continues to be harsh.
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